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Abstract The debate about whether the arts should be supported or not is far from
new, and most governments support the arts in one way or the other. The literature
considers several arguments in favor of such interventions. Public education may seem
to be an action which could, in the long run, lead to possible reductions of subsidies.
Surveys show that those who have been exposed to the arts when young participate
more when adult. However, the ‘‘non-market’’ transmission from parents to children
generates an external effect, which has to be taken into account to reach first-best
situations. We construct an overlapping generations model in which young consumers
are exposed to both public education toward the arts and to non-altruistic transmission
of such a taste from their parents. We show that the first-best can be reached only if
there is both public cultural education and subsidization of arts consumption.
Therefore, education cannot be considered as a substitute for subsidies to arts con-
sumption. However, as is often the case in European countries, government
intervention is usually below the first-best level. Using a model calibrated on French
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data, we show that it is then preferable to subsidize education, while consumption,
especially of the older generations, should be taxed rather than subsidized.
Keywords Arts consumption  Education  Subsidization of arts consumption
JEL classification Z1  H23  D9
1 Introduction
The debate about whether the arts should be supported or not is far from new, and
though the problems and the approaches may vary across countries (and
‘‘cultures’’), most governments are in favor of subsidizing the arts in one way or
the other.
The United States are representative of the tradition in which the arts were
mainly supported by noblemen, kings and popes, though, in modern times, these are
industrialists turned into benefactors and patrons. Public budgets are rather modest,1
but some congressmen find even that to be too much, and given away to politically
incorrect or unjustified activities.2 Countries in continental Europe (France and
Italy, among others) represent the other extreme of the spectrum, where most artistic
activities are supported by the State. In France, the objective for culture is to reach a
budget that amounts to 1% of government expenditure; this is almost the case in
1998, with $2.5 billion, representing 0.95% of the total budget. The United
Kingdom stands in between, with a public budget of $1.4 billion, complemented by
private donations and, more recently, by the National Lottery, which not only funds
institutions, but even goes as far as commissioning art.3
Though ‘‘top of the agenda for the ministers [of France, Italy, and the United
Kingdom] is to make the arts more accessible to all,’’4 the policies followed can be
very different. For instance, the French insist that museums should charge visitors—
and they do so—while free admission at the six British national museums—which
used to charge—was achieved in January 2002.
The arguments used in the economics literature to justify subsidies are discussed
in the last chapter of Grampp (1989), who it should be said finds these arguments
unconvincing. The list is long: (a) art is a public good, which, unless it gets
subsidized, is not produced in a sufficient amount; (b) it yields positive externalities,
(c) it is a merit good, (d) its demand depends on its supply, and if it were not
available, consumers would not know its value, (e) for equity and efficiency reasons,
it should be made available to everyone, and not only to those who can afford it,
(f) the stock of art must be maintained, and maintaining is not a profitable activity,
1 In 1990, governmental assistance was $900 million, while charitable contributions amounted to
$650 million. See Heilbrun and Gray (1993, p. 8). Paul Mellon alone gave away some $600 million
during the last 50 years. See The Art Newspaper, April 1999.
2 On the debate about the funding by the National Endowment for the Arts, see Marquis Goldfarb (1995).
3 See The Art Newspaper, April 1999.
4 See The Art Newspaper, February 1999.
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(g) producing art involves large fixed costs, and consumers should be charged only
the marginal cost, to consume the available supply (the capacity of a museum or of a
concert hall), and (h) art is labor intensive and productivity gains are hardly
possible.5 Most of these arguments can be used for many commodities or sectors,
and have been studied by economists in more general settings than here. The last
argument (due to Baumol and Bowen 1965, 1966) on the difficulty or impossibility
of achieving productivity gains is more specific to the performing arts.
The reasons for justifying public support are mainly based on the normative, but
unverified, assumption that ‘‘art is useful,’’ and so are the arguments in favor of
cultural education. In 1999, the French Minister of education pointed out that, in this
respect, ‘‘France is lagging behind’’ since only 3% of the children of school age are
exposed to some form of artistic education. The departments of education and of
culture will have to decide on joint initiatives geared to educating children.6
Public education may indeed seem to be an action which could, in the long run,
lead to possible reductions of subsidies. Indeed, surveys show that arts education,
both at school and in the family or close community, increases participation in the
arts. Bergonzi and Smith (1996) even show that providing both has superadditive
effects on participation.7 There are also dynamic effects which are at play, since
parents will transmit the knowledge they were exposed to while young.8 Public
education has therefore the usual direct effect on children, and the indirect effect
through the transfer from parents to children. Therefore, one may think that arts
education could, if sufficiently intensive, provide enough incentives for consumers
to participate, so that the direct support of arts consumption could be reduced or
even dispensed with. This would also leave to consumers, and not to government
agencies, the choice of which activities to support.
This will however not be so if, as is assumed by Becker and Tomes (1986),
culture is ‘‘automatically transferred from parents to children.’’ Given its automatic
and thus non-altruistic character, this private transmission of education cannot be
internalized by parents and public intervention is needed for agents to consume the
socially optimal level of culture.9 The (optimal) level of subsidies will depend on
the (optimal) level of public education, but the former cannot be fully replaced by
the latter. This is the issue that we study in our paper, without questionning whether
culture is important or not, but we assume that arts consumption has a positive
impact on consumers’ utility.
The dynamic nature of the problem, and the intergenerational transfer of
knowledge, leads us to introduce (Sect. 2) an overlapping generations model in
which agents live three periods. In period 0, they are exposed to arts education
5 See also Chap. 11 in Heilbrun and Gray (1993).
6 See Le Journal des Arts, April 1999.
7 See also Heilbrun and Gray (1993, p. 362).
8 Bisin and Verdier (2001) were among the first to study the dynamics of cultural transmission. Their
model aims at studying the stationary distribution of preference traits. We are interested in the tradeoff
between arts education and arts subsidiation.
9 The model studied by Bisin and Verdier (2001) also assumes that parents transfer their culture to their
offsprings in a paternalistic way.
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provided by schools, and inherit (at least, in part) the cultural capital of their parents.
In period 1, they work and consume two goods: an aggregate commodity and art. In
period 2, they retire, but still consume both goods.
In Sect. 3, we turn to the stationary state of this economy and study under which
conditions this first-best can be decentralized. We show that though the government
chooses the optimal level of public cultural education, subsidizing arts consumption
can only be partly avoided, given that parents are supposed non-altruistic: support is
needed for the consumption of the young, but can be cut back for retirees.
Section 4 considers the results of a model whose parameters try to capture the
situation that prevails in most continental European countries, where the current
level of public expenditure devoted to the arts is well below the first-best level that
is generated by the calibrated model. We show that if this is the case, arts
consumption (and, therefore, production) should be much less subsidized (and may
even be taxed), while more should be devoted to public arts education.
Our results lead to two conclusions that are in stark contrast with the behavior of
most governments which tend to subsidize cultural consumption rather than
education to the arts, and consumption of retirees more than that of young agents.
Though the first-best with non-altruistic parents requires subsidizing both education
and consumption, we show that only the young generation’s consumption should
benefit from subsidies. Most economies are, however, characterized by second-best
situations. In that case, we show that it is more useful to subsidize education than
consumption.
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We assume that the economy consists of one sector, with overlapping generations of
consumers and competitive firms producing a commodity that is both the usual
consumption-investment good and ‘‘art.’’
Population is constant. Each of the N identical consumers (households) lives
three periods: childhood, young age, old age. As a child, a consumer makes no
decisions of his own, but is exposed to public cultural education, the level of which
is decided and financed by the government and, within the household, to the culture
transmitted by his parents. He works when young, supplying the unit of labor he is
endowed with. In period t, his wage income wt is spent to consume ct units of the
consumption good and at units of art, which may be taxed or subsidized at a rate h
a
t ;
he saves st for his old age; he also pays (or receives) a lump-sum T
1
t to finance
public education in culture, as well as possible subsidies. In period 2, he retires,
earns st(1 + rt+1) from his savings in period 1 (rt+1 is the interest rate), spends dt+1
on consumption, bt+1 on art, possibly taxed or subsidized at a rate h
b
tþ1 and pays (or
receives) a lump-sum T2tþ1:
The two-period utility function of the typical consumer u(ct, kt, dt+1, lt+1)
depends on the consumption good in both periods, ct and dt+1, and on ‘‘cultural
capital stocks,’’ kt and lt+1, produced within the household a` la Stigler and Becker
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(1977).10 This process uses as inputs public arts education, the cultural capital
acquired from the family and through habit formation, and arts consumption itself.
We thus model art as a good that is addictive. More specifically, we assume the
following:
kt ¼ /ðet1; kt1; atÞ; ð1Þ
and
ltþ1 ¼ wðkt; btþ1Þ: ð2Þ
In period 1, the cultural capital of the (young) consumer is influenced by his past
exposure to public education (et-1) and to family culture (kt-1) as a child, as well as
by the amount of art that he consumes (at). When old, the consumer inherits from
his past habits (kt) and can still increase his capital by consuming bt+1 units of art.
We assume that the functions appearing in (1) and (2) are differentiable, and that all
the partial derivatives are positive: the stock of habits is increasing in education, in
the past stock and in the consumption of art.
In Eq. 1, kt-1 is taken as given by agents born in t, and represents the external
effect of culture within the family. An alternative way of looking at this is to assume
that kt-1 represents a social externality, the mean cultural capital of the previous
generation.11 Since in our model, agents are identical, the two formulations lead to
the same conclusions. More generally, kt-1 can be thought of as resulting from both
a family and a community or social effect, which is consistent with the Bergonzi and
Smith (1996) survey results alluded to in the introduction.
When making his decision, a consumer takes as given prices wt, rt+1, lump-sum
transfers T1t ; T
2
tþ1; possibly non-zero tax (or subsidy) rates h
a
t ; h
b
tþ1; the level of
public education et-1, as well as his parents’ cultural capital kt-1, and solves the
following problem:
maxct ;at ;st ;dtþ1;btþ1 uðct; kt; dtþ1; ltþ1Þ; ð3Þ
subject to his budget constraints
ct þ ð1  hat Þat þ st ¼ wt  T1t ; ð4Þ
and
dtþ1 þ ð1  hbtþ1Þbtþ1 ¼ ð1 þ rtþ1Þst  T2tþ1; ð5Þ
where kt and lt+1 are defined by (1) and (2). The utility function defined in (3) is
assumed strictly concave, increasing in all its arguments, and twice continuously
differentiable.
Production is carried out by identical perfectly competitive firms. Aggregate
output Yt is given by
10 In terms of the Stigler and Becker model, this process could also be described in two steps. ‘‘Taste for
the arts’’ is produced by a function that depends on the consumption of arts and on human capital
produced within the household (say, through learning by doing) by accumulating the effects of past tastes.
11 As is the case for the external effects of human capital in e.g., Lucas (1988) or Azariadis and Drazen
(1990).
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Yt ¼ FðKt; LtÞ; ð6Þ
where Kt and Lt represent aggregate capital and labor demand, and F is homoge-
neous of degree one. The behavior of the representative firm is:
maxKt ;Lt FðKt; LtÞ  ð1 þ rtÞKt  wtLt; ð7Þ
where we assume complete depreciation of the capital stock in every period.
The government collects (or redistributes) lump-sum transfers, finances educa-
tion in the arts and may tax consumption. It has no optimizing behavior and simply
seeks to satisfy its budget constraint
et þ hat at þ hbt bt ¼ T1t þ T2t ; ð8Þ
where et; h
a
t ; h
b
t and say, T
1
t are given.
Market equilibrium on the goods market,12 the labor market, and the capital
market, respectively, requires the three following conditions to hold:
Nðct þ dt þ at þ bt þ et þ stÞ ¼ Yt; ð9Þ
Lt ¼ N; ð10Þ
Kt ¼ Nst1: ð11Þ
An intertemporal overlapping generations equilibrium is defined by a sequence of
consumptions (ct, at, dt+1, bt+1), capital stocks Kt, labor demands Lt, public education
et, lump-sum transfers ðT1t ; T2t Þ; tax or subsidy rates ðhat ; hbt Þ; supported by prices
(wt, rt), satisfying (1) to (11) for t = 0, 1, ...
Along the perfect foresight equilibrium path, and assuming interior solutions, the
following first-order conditions will hold for the consumer optimization problem:
u0c ¼ ð1 þ rtþ1Þu0d; ð12Þ
ð1  hat Þu0c ¼ ½u0k þ u0lw0k/0a; ð13Þ
and
ð1  hbtþ1Þu0d ¼ u0lw0b: ð14Þ
In all these expressions, u0x denotes the partial derivative of u() with respect to
argument x, evaluated in equilibrium (ct, kt, dt+1, lt+1); likewise, w
0
x and /
0
x are
derivatives of w() and /() with respect to x, evaluated in equilibrium.
Equation 12 is the usual Euler condition describing the arbitrage between first-
and second-period consumptions, ct and dt+1. Equations 13 and 14 represent the
tradeoff between consumption of the commodity and of art in period 1 (ct and at)
and in period 2 (dt+1 and bt+1), respectively. Equation 13 shows that for the young
consumer, the loss of utility when he foregoes one unit of the consumption good
should, in equilibrium, be equal to the marginal utility of one additional unit of art
that accrues over the two periods of his life (ð1  hat Þ1u0k/0a when young and
12 Note that there is only one good in this economy. This can be rationalized if arts production results
from a linear technology that transforms the usual consumption good into art. By a suitable normalization,
both goods can then be aggregated.
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ð1  hat Þ1u0lw0k/0a when old). Equation 14 can be interpreted in a similar way for
the retired consumer.
From the producer optimization problem, and since Lt = N, it follows that
F0KðKt; NÞ ¼ ð1 þ rtÞ; ð15Þ
and
F0LðKt; NÞ ¼ wt; ð16Þ
where F0KðÞ and F0LðÞ are the derivatives of the production function with respect to
labor and capital.
3 The long-run first-best solution and its decentralization
Let kt : Kt/N and f(kt) : F(kt,1). Market equilibrium is now defined by f(kt) = kt+1
+ ct + at + dt + bt + et. Let X
t, 0\X\1 be the discount factor, and, to simplify
calculations, replace lt+1 by w(kt, bt+1) in the objective function. The centralized
program can now be written, in per capita terms, as:
max
ct ;at ;bt ;dt ;et
X1
t¼0
Xtuðct; kt; dtþ1;wðkt; btþ1ÞÞ;
subject to
kt ¼ /ðet1; kt1; atÞ; t ¼ 0; . . .;1
and
f ðktÞ ¼ ktþ1 þ ct þ at þ dt þ bt þ et; t ¼ 0; . . .;1
for given k0, k-1.
This solution achieves the highest welfare. The question to which we turn now is
to determine under which conditions this optimum can be decentralized as a steady-
state equilibrium. The main result is stated in Proposition 1.13
Proposition 1 The first-best steady-state is an equilibrium steady-state if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(a) public cultural education e is set at its optimal level;
(b) art consumption by the young is subsidized at a rate ha ¼ X/0k;
(c) art consumption by the old should not be subsidized or taxed: hb = 0;
(d) lump-sum transfers T1 and T2 lead to the modified golden-rule capital stock.
The proposition shows that to achieve a first-best, arts consumption of the young
should be subsidized, even if the level of public cultural education to which children
are exposed is chosen optimally. The rate at which this consumption should be
supported is equal to the marginal influence the cultural capital of parents has on the
13 See Appendix, sections ‘‘First-order conditions of the welfare optimum’’, ‘‘Steady-state conditions for
consumers’ equilibrium’’ and ‘‘Decentralizing the welfare optimum’’ for detailed calculations.
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cultural capital of children.14 Moreover, if /00k;e [ 0 (which will be the case if, as
shown by Bergonzi and Smith (1996), the effects of education and transmission
from parents are superadditive), then a marginal increase in public education will
even strengthen the positive consequences of the transmission from parents to
children.
Since we assume that the educational effect of grand-parents on their grand-
children can be neglected (it is set to zero in the model), arts consumption of the old
generation should not be subsidized. This is at variance with observed situations in
which the arts consumption of retirees is often more subsidized than that of the
young generations.
The lump-sum transfers that are needed to reach the welfare optimum have two
origins. First, overlapping agents are not altruistic, and, even in the absence of
culture, the marginal rate of substitution u0d=u
0
c between second and first life cycle
periods may not necessarily be equal to the social discount rate X. This creates an
imperfection the effect of which has to be removed by lump-sum transfers to make
decentralization possible. Second, there is the externality due to the imperfect
transmission of culture from parents to children which gives way to subsidies to
education as well as to consumption and to transfers. Even in cases when, by
chance, the incentives to save are consistent with the optimal level of capital, i.e.,
when u0d=u
0
c ¼ X; positive transfers T1 + T2 are needed in order to balance the
government budget while preserving this optimal level. Therefore, the lump-sum
transfers T1 and T2 have two roles, and it is difficult to disentangle them in any other
way than by relying on numerical simulation.
4 Second-best analysis
We now consider the second-best problem, in which T, the government budget (for
the arts) is fixed, at a smaller than the first-best steady-state budget, T*, and seek to
maximize consumers’ utility.
4.1 The second-best problem
To simplify calculations (and save on a parameter that is difficult to assess), we
assume that there is no discounting so that the discount factor is equal to 1 and
r* = 0.15 We choose the golden rule capital level k* for which f0(k*) = 1 and f(k*)
- k* = w*. Given T, it is always possible to decentralize the equilibrium for any
policy (ha, hb, e), as long as there is no restriction on the intergenerational
distribution (T1, T2). Once T is given, one can compute w* - T, the life-cycle budget
14 No subsidy is needed only if /0k ¼ 0: This will be so in a population in which the cultural level of the
family has no action on the level of cultural appreciation of the young, i.e., if kt = /(et-1, at) instead of
the formulation suggested in Eq. 1, or if there is satiation in k at the optimal level of education, or before
this level is reached.
15 See Appendix.
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of consumers who take as given w* - T, ha, hb, e as well as their parents cultural
capital k and maximize u(c, k, d, l) subject to their budget constraint
w  T ¼ c þ ð1  haÞa þ d þ ð1  hbÞb; ð17Þ
while k and l must satisfy k ¼ /ðe; k; aÞ and l = w(k, b). This maximization
leads to decisions c(), a(), d(), b(), k(), l() and indirect utility v() that depend
on w*-T, ha, hb, e and k:
Now, given T, the government’s second-best problem is to choose e, ha and hb
which maximize indirect utility vðw  T ; ha; hb; e; kÞ; subject to
T ¼ e þ haaðÞ þ hbbðÞ;
and
/ðe; k; aÞ ¼ k:
This is a problem that is difficult to tackle in its full generality. We therefore
move to a Cobb-Douglas economy,16 and to simulations of a model calibrated on
the basis of French national accounts.
4.2 A Cobb-Douglas economy
We consider the formulation of the model in which both habit formation equations
(1) and (2), and the utility function (3) are linear in logarithms, so that
logk ¼ qloge þ d1logk þ g1loga; ð18Þ
logl ¼ d2logk þ g2logb; ð19Þ
and
uðc; k; d; lÞ ¼ logc þ alogk þ bðlogd þ aloglÞ: ð20Þ
All parameters are positive and d1, the inherited effect of cultural accumulation, is
smaller than one.
The second-best solution, as well as the calibration of the model, are described in
Appendix ‘‘Second-best in a Cobb-Douglas economy’’. This appendix also shows
the expressions for the two subsidy rates ha, hb and for arts education e as functions
of the total cultural budget T and of the other given parameters (see B12–B14). The
following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 For any total budget T\ T* , where T* is the first-best budget, the
second-best solution is such that:
(a) the subsidy rate on art consumption by the old is negative (i.e., the old are
taxed); ha , the subsidy rate on art consumption by the young is larger than hb;
16 Therefore, the results are not general. We have an example of an economy in which b, the cultural
good consumed when old, is an inferior good, and the results that will be described do not hold. But our
conjecture is that if all the goods in the model are normal—as they are in the Cobb-Douglas economy—
the results that we derive should hold.
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(b) both rates, as well as the level of public education e are non-decreasing in T.
The Cobb-Douglas example points to the possibility that the young may also be
taxed if some conditions on the parameters are satisfied, and if T is sufficiently
small.
4.3 Calibration and simulation results
The coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas economy are chosen so that the resulting
consumptions of the young and of the old, both for the good and the arts, reproduce
some stylized facts observed in France, which can be thought of being
representative of continental European countries. Details on this calibration can
be found in Appendix ‘‘Second-best in a Cobb-Douglas economy’’.
Table 1 displays the first-best values17 of T*/w* and e*/w* (expression (B15) and
(B16) in Appendix ‘‘Second-best in a Cobb-Douglas economy’’) generated by the
model for various choices of a, the relative preference for arts consumption in the
utility function, and where, to simplify, we set q = (1 - d1) (q and d1 represent
the effects of public and household arts education). The numbers in Table 1 show
that (with one exception when a = 0.05 and q = 0.875) first-best budgets are well
above 5% for all reasonable choices of a and q.
Stylized facts suggest that T/w* is well below 5%.18 The current French situation
is thus hardly a first-best.
Figure 1, illustrates the e/w*, ha and hb curves as functions of T/w*, for our best
guess of the parameters a = 0.10 and q = d1 = 0.5. For these values of the
parameters, Table 1 shows that the first-best total budget for arts should be equal to
9.9%, the largest part of which (8.9%) should be devoted to education. As can be
checked, for T/w* values smaller than 5% (which is probably an upper bound in
most European countries), arts consumption of the young should hardly be
subsidized (ha = 0 for T/w* = 0.045 and becomes negative (a tax) for lower budget
shares). Arts consumption of the old generations should always be taxed, which is
just the opposite of what happens in the real world, since usually, elderly people get
larger discounts than other adults.
5 Conclusions
Our model suggests that even if the level of public cultural education is optimal, the
first-best obtains if and only if the consumption of art by the young generation is
subsidized. This result is due to the social external effect resulting from the
‘‘automatic’’ transmission of culture from parents to children, as stressed by Becker
17 The theoretical results presented in the Appendix can also be expressed in terms of ratios T*/w* and
e*/w*. This makes the calibration exercise easier to deal with.
18 It is difficult to estimate the value of T/w* with more accuracy, since arts are supported at different
levels (central or federal, state, local, etc.), and no global accounts are available.
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and Tomes (1986), for whom ‘‘both biology and culture are transmitted from parents
to children, one encoded in DNA and the other in a family’s culture.’’
Several issues need to be discussed, however. The first is concerned with
altruism. With altruistic agents, the external effect generated by families transmit-
ting culture to their posterity would disappear, and public subsidies would no longer
be needed. Pure altruism is, however, conflicting with the automatic character of the
transmission of culture, which has been underlined above.19
There may also exist social externalities, acquired either from the close
community of friends and schoolmates, or from the general cultural level of the
population. These externalities can be represented by the mean value of the
individual kt-1 appearing in the /() functions, and again, subsidies will be needed
to reach the first-best, even if consumers are altruistic. Thus, in the more realistic
Fig. 1 Second-best solutions
Table 1 First-best total budget for the arts (T*/w*) and budget for artistic education (e*/w*)
q = 0.875 0.750 0.500
T*/w* e*/w* T*/w* e*/w* T*/w* e*/w*
a = 0.05 0.048 0.047 0.051 0.047 0.057 0.046
a = 0.10 0.091 0.089 0.093 0.089 0.099 0.089
a = 0.15 0.130 0.129 0.132 0.128 0.137 0.127
a = 0.20 0.166 0.164 0.167 0.164 0.173 0.163
19 Parents buy books that they want to read, and do not necessarily think of their childrens’ utility when
choosing. The books are of course also available for their children to read, but this is considered as
paternalism, and not as altruism, and leads to external effects.
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case where both family and social externalities are at play, but only family
externalities can be internalized if consumers are altruistic, public intervention will
still be useful.
We show that retirees should not be subsidized. This is so because, in our model,
they do not transmit culture to their grand-children. Should this be the case—it is
often said that grand-parents take their grand-children to museums or to concerts—
then the art consumption of the old would also need to be subsidized, at a rate that
corresponds to their influence, and which may be different from that of the young.
This (as well as the results of the model according to which old generations should
not be subsidized at all) raises the question of whether it is possible to discriminate
between generations. This is obviously the case for many cultural activities where
presence is required, such as concerts, movies, theater plays, etc. But there are also
many activities where this is impossible to implement: books and records can be
bought by the young for the old, television can be watched without any control as to
who watches, etc.
Heterogeneous agents, some of whom are better exposed to art than others,
possibly because they finance education within their own group, would also lead to
interesting questions, since different subsidy rates would be needed to decentralize
the first-best. This would be implementable only if some characteristics related to
the agents’ heterogeneity can be observed, such as income, or the level of schooling.
However, the use of numerical simulations to study the consequences of second-
best situations shows that for plausible parameter values, and since the government
budget for the arts is smaller than what is required in a first-best and in a second-
best, arts consumption of ‘‘old’’ consumers should be taxed, arts consumption of the
young should not be subsidized, and all the proceeds of arts public expenditure
should be devoted to arts education.
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Appendix
First-order conditions of the welfare optimum
An interior optimal solution of the welfare optimum of Sect. 3, should satisfy all the
first-order conditions as well as the transversality conditions of the Lagrangian
function where Xt qt and X
t pt are the multipliers associated with the constraints of
the program. From these first-order conditions, one can derive the following
conditions that should be satisfied in the stationary state of the welfare optimum:
Xf 0ðkÞ ¼ 1 ðA1Þ
u0c ¼ p ðA2Þ
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u0d ¼ Xp ðA3Þ
q/0a ¼ p ðA4Þ
u0lw
0
b ¼ Xp ðA5Þ
Xq/0e ¼ p ðA6Þ
u0k þ u0lw0k ¼ ð1  X/0kÞq ðA7Þ
k ¼ /ðe; k; aÞ ðA8Þ
k þ c þ a þ d þ b þ e ¼ f ðkÞ: ðA9Þ
In all these expressions, the derivatives are taken in the optimum. Combining (A2)
and (A3), one sees that
Xu0c ¼ u0d ðA10Þ
Combining (A2), (A4) leeds to q ¼ u0c=/0a: Replacing q* by this expression in
(A7), one obtains
ðu0k þ u0lw0kÞ/0a ¼ ð1  X/0kÞu0c: ðA11Þ
Finally, from (A3) and (A5)
u0lw
0
b ¼ u0d: ðA12Þ
Steady-state conditions for consumers’ equilibrium
In the steady-state, the following first-order conditions hold (for an interior
solution):
u0c ¼ ð1 þ rÞu0d ðA13Þ
ð1  haÞu0c ¼ ðu0k þ u0lw0kÞ/0a ðA14Þ
ð1  hbÞu0d ¼ u0lw0b; ðA15Þ
and the budget constraints
c ¼ w  T1  ð1  haÞa  s ðA16Þ
d ¼ ð1 þ rÞs  T2  ð1  hbÞb ðA17Þ
are satisfied.
Decentralizing the welfare optimum
We now check whether and how the first-best can be decentralized as a steady-state
equilibrium solution. The steady-state resource constraints of the centralized
problem are obviously satisfied in every equilibrium. With competitive producers,
lump-sum transfers to consumers make it possible to reach the optimal capital stock
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for which, by (A1), f0(k*) = X-1. Therefore, it is sufficient (a) to verify that the
first-best satisfies the steady-state first-order conditions (A13)–(A15) of the
consumers’ problem, (b) to compute the necessary lump-sum transfers in order to
satisfy the consumers’ budget constraints (A16)–(A17) and (c) to verify whether the
government’s budget is in equilibrium.
(a) By (15) and (A1), r* = X-1-1, and (A13) coincides with (A10). So do (A14)
and (A11) iff ha ¼ X/0k: Finally, (A15) coincides with (A12) iff hb = 0.
(b) Setting s = k*, r = X-1-1, w = f(k*) - k*f0(k*) = f(k*) - X-1 k*, equilib-
rium values for the transfers can be computed as:
T1 ¼ f ðkÞ  X1k  ðc þ ð1  haÞa þ kÞ ðA18Þ
T2 ¼ X1k  ðd þ bÞ; ðA19Þ
using (A16) and (A17).
(c) Finally, adding (A18) and (A19) and using (A9), it is straightforward to check
that:
T ¼ T1 þ T2 ¼ e þ haa;
which shows that the government budget (8) is also in equilibrium.
Second-best in a Cobb-Douglas economy20
The Marshallian demand functions and calibration
We substitute (18) and (19) in (20), and obtain
u ¼ logc þ blogd þ a1loga þ a2logb þ a3loge þ a4logk; ðB1Þ
where
a1 ¼ ag1ð1 þ bd2Þ; a2 ¼ bag2; a3 ¼ aqð1 þ bd2Þ; a4 ¼ ad1ð1 þ bd2Þ: ðB2Þ
To compute the indirect utility function, we first maximize (B1) under the budget
constraint (17). This leads to the following Marshallian demand functions:
c ¼ cðw  TÞ; ðB3Þ
d ¼ bcðw  TÞ; ðB4Þ
ð1  haÞa ¼ a1cðw  TÞ; ðB5Þ
ð1  hbÞb ¼ a2cðw  TÞ; ðB6Þ
where c = 1/(1 + b + a1 + a2).
Using French national accounts, as well as the results of a survey on cultural
expenditures of French households carried out in 1995,21 one can compute the
20 Recall that, for simplicity, we assume that X = 1.
21 See Maresca and Pouquet (2000).
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(inclusive taxes and subsidies) expenditure shares reproduced in Table A, which
also shows the corresponding parameters to which they correspond in the
Marshallian demand functions (B3)–(B6).
These are the basic parameters for the Cobb-Douglas economy, from which most
of the other parameters will be deduced. See Sect. 4.3.
Computation of the indirect utility function
To derive the indirect utility function, we replace in (B1) c, d, a and b by their
expressions in (B3)–(B6), also taking into account that, in the fixed point, k ¼ k and
that the government budget constraint e ¼ T  haa  hbb has to be satisfied. This
leads to the following expression of the indirect utility function:
Vðha; hb; w  TÞ ¼ð1=c þ b1Þlogðw  TÞ þ ða1 þ b1Þlogð1  haÞ1
þ a2logð1  hbÞ1 þ b2log T  ða1hað1  haÞ1
h
þ a2hbð1  hbÞ1Þcðw  TÞ þ const:
where
b1 ¼ a4g1=ð1  d1Þ; b2 ¼ a3 þ a4q=ð1  d1Þ: ðB7Þ
To check for the concavity properties of this function, in ha\ 1, hb\ 1 for any T
C 0, w* - T [ 0, e [ 0, it is convenient to make the following substitution:
xa ¼ ha=ð1  haÞ; xb ¼ hb=ð1  hbÞ; ðB8Þ
which leads to the following expression for the indirect utility function:
Vðxa; xb; w  TÞ ¼ð1=c þ b1Þlogðw  TÞ þ ða1 þ b1Þlogð1  xaÞ þ a2logð1  xbÞ
þb2log T þ ða1xa þ a2xbÞcðw  TÞ
 
:
It is easy to check that this function is concave in xa, xb\ 1 (which is true when
to values ha, hb\ 1). Therefore, its maximum is characterized by the following first-
order conditions:
oV=oxa ¼ ða1 þ b1Þ=ð1  xaÞ
þ a1b2cðw  TÞ=½T þ ða1xa þ a2xbÞcðw  TÞ ¼ 0;
ðB9Þ
and
oV=oxb ¼ a2=ð1  xbÞ
þ a2b2cðw  TÞ=½T þ ða1xa þ a2xbÞcðw  TÞ ¼ 0:
ðB10Þ
In the solution, the government budget constraint e = T - ha a - hb b must also
hold. Replacing a and b by (B5) and (B6), and using (B8), this constraint can be
rewritten as:
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e ¼ T þ ða1xa þ a2xbÞcðw  TÞ: ðB11Þ
Solving for the second-best optimum
Solving the system of three equation (B9), (B10) and (B11) in three unknowns xa, xb
and e leads to:
e ¼ b2½T þ cða1 þ a2Þðw  TÞ=ða1 þ b1 þ a2 þ b2Þ; ðB12Þ
ð1  xaÞ1 ¼ ð1  haÞ ¼ a1ða1 þ b1 þ a2 þ b2Þða1 þ b1Þ½ða1 þ a2Þ þ T=cðw  TÞ
; ðB13Þ
ð1  xbÞ1 ¼ ð1  hbÞ ¼ ða1 þ b1 þ a2 þ b2Þða1 þ a2Þ þ T=cðw  TÞ : ðB14Þ
Using (B12)–(B14), it is easy to check that:
(a) e is increasing in T since c(a1 + a2) \ 1,
(b) ha and hb are increasing in T,
(c) ha [ hb.
Since hb is increasing in T and equal to zero in the first-best, we necessarily have
hb \ 0 in the second-best. The condition ha [ 0 is equivalent to (a1 b2 - b1 a2) c
(w* - T)\ (a1 + b1)T. There are thus two possibilities. Either a1b2 - b1a2 B 0 so
that ha[ 0 for all T[ 0. Or a1b2 - b1a2[ 0 and then h
a\ 0 for small T, i.e., for T
such that T \ c(a1b2 - b1a2)/[a1 + b1 + c (a1b2 - b1a2)]w*.
Some first-best results
To compare first-best and second-best results, we need T*, the first-best value of the
government budget. This is obtained as follows. The first-best is the maximal value
of the utility, obtained by substituting k and l by (18) and (19) in (20) and, in the
fixed-point, setting k ¼ k; so that
u ¼ logc þ blogd þ ða1 þ b1Þloga þ a2logb þ b2loge:
The maximum of u* subject to the golden rule resources constraint f(k*) -
k* = c + a + d + b + e, leads to
e ¼ b2w=ð1 þ b þ a1 þ b1 þ a2 þ b2Þ; ðB15Þ
a ¼ ða1 þ b1Þw=ð1 þ b þ a1 þ b1 þ a2 þ b2Þ;
since f(k*)-k* = w*. Using the fact that the values of the optimal subsidy rates are
ha = d1, h
b = 0, we obtain T* = e* + d1 a*, and
T ¼ ½b2 þ d1ða1 þ b1Þw=ð1 þ b þ a1 þ b1 þ a2 þ b2Þ: ðB16Þ
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Parameterization of the Cobb-Douglas economy
From the values in Table A, it is easy to compute b ^ 0.5, a1 = 0.018, and
a2 = 0.006. We assume that the effect on the cultural stock of consuming arts is the
same when young or old, which implies g1 = g2. Using (B2), one can check that a1/
a2 = (1 + bd2)/b = 3 and d2 ^ 1, which can be interpreted as ‘‘nothing is lost’’ in
the transmission of cultural capital to oneself (when ‘‘switching’’ from young to
old). We also assume that the effect of education (q) on the stock of culture of the
young is equal to (1 - d1), to represent in a parametric way, the relative effects of
education and family transmission.
Since it is hard to find values for a and d1, we shall, in the simulations,
parameterize a for values ranging from 0.05 to 0.2 and d1 for values between 0.125
and 0.50.
Now the values of all the other parameters (a3, a4, b1, b2, g1, g2, q) can be
computed as functions of a and d1, using (B2) and (B7).
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